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MUDDYING THE WATERS: UNITED STATES V CUNDIFF ADDS
CONFUSION AND COMPLEXITY TO THE ONGOING




In his brief concurring opinion in Rapanos v. United States
(Rapanos),' Chief Justice John Roberts stated: "[I]t is unfortunate
that no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely
how to read Congress' limits on the reach of the Clean Water Act.
Lower courts and regulated entities will now have to feel their way
on a case-by-case basis."2 After four years and nearly thirty federal
court decisions interpreting the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act
(CWA), the words of the Chief Justice appear to have been pro-
phetic, as the lower federal courts struggle to define the reach of
federal jurisdiction over wetlands, a fundamental question under
the CWA.3
Today, our country's leaders generally recognize the signifi-
cant value of the nation's wetlands.4 Important wetland functions
include floodwater storage, water quality improvement, shoreline
1. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
2. Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (explaining ChiefJustice's concerns
with outcome of Rapanos).
3. Post-Rapanos Caselaw, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wet
lands/upload/Post-RapanosCaselaw.pdf (last visited May 1, 2011) [hereinafter
Post-Rapanos Caselaw] (providing list of post-Rapanos federal court decisions on sub-
ject of CWA jurisdiction). Since the Rapanos decision, there have been ten deci-
sions on CWA jurisdiction by federal circuit courts, and sixteen decisions by
federal district courts. Id. "By accepting certiorari in Rapanos, the Court implicitly
agreed" to resolve the scope of federal jurisdiction under the CWA, but the Court
was unable to do so. Mark Latham, Rapanos v. United States: Significant Nexus or
Significant Confusion? The Failure of the Supreme Court to Clearly Define the Scope of Fed-
eral Wetland jurisdiction, in Essays on the Supreme Court's Clean Water Act Jurisprudence
as Reflected in Rapanos v. United States, VT. J. ENVTL. LAw 5, 21 (2007), available at
http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10004.pdf. The Chief Justice appears to
have "foreshadowed this rudderless direction" in his concurring opinion in Rapa-
nos. SeeJennifer L. Bolger & Edward B. Witte, Post Rapanos: The Regulatory Miasma
Engulfing Isolated Wetlands and the Clean Water Act, 13 ABA ACIUC. MGMT. COMM.
NEWSL. 1, 9 (Aug. 2009), available at http://apps.ameicanbar.org/environ/com-
mittees/agricult/newsletter/aug09/AgMgmt.Aug9.pdf.
4. M. LYNNE CORN & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41311, THE
DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: COASTAL WETLAND AND WILDLIFE IMPACTS AND RE-
SPONSE, 1 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41311.pdf (pro-
viding overview of functional value of America's wetlands). Historically, wetlands
were viewed as having little intrinsic value and therefore many federal programs
(285)
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protection, and habitation for fish, shellfish, and other wildlife.5
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined wet-
lands as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vege-
tation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."6 In
general, wetlands include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar ar-
eas.7 The significant functional and economical qualities of wet-
lands reinforce the importance of understanding the federal
government's ability to regulate wetlands under the CWA. 8
By accepting the opportunity to review Rapanos, the Supreme
Court intended to clarify the federal government's jurisdiction over
wetlands under the CWA, an issue not fully addressed in two previ-
ous cases the Court heard on the subject.9 A majority of Justices
failed to agree on the scope of the federal government's jurisdic-
tion, however, resulting in conflicting jurisdictional tests that have
plagued the lower federal courts.' 0 As courts struggle to define the
jurisdictional boundaries of the CWA, cases centering on whether
wetlands should be protected as "waters of the United States" under
the CWA continue to arise."
encouraged their destruction. Id. Today, however, both scientists and policymak-
ers recognize their important functional and economical qualities. Id.
5. See id. at 2 (providing details on important wetland functions).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (2010) (defining "wetlands" for CWA purposes).
7. See id. (providing examples of types of land that typically meet definition of
wetland).
8. Functions and Values of Wetlands, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/
upload/2006 08_11_wetlandsfunval.pdf (last visited May 1, 2011) (providing
general overview of functions and values of wetlands). Today, wetlands are recog-
nized as providing many benefits to both people and wildlife. Id. Important func-
tions include protecting water quality and providing a habitat for fish and wildlife.
Id. Almost $79 billion is generated each year from wetland-dependent species,
which comprised seventy-one percent of our nation's $111 billion commercial fish-
ing industry in 1997. Id. "[I]t can be difficult to calculate the economic value
provided by a single wetland," but it is possible to assign a dollar value to the
"range of services" provided by all wetlands. Economic Benefits of Wetlands Fact Sheet,
EPA, http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/upload/EconomicBenefits.pdf (last vis-
ited May 1, 2011). According to one assessment from 1997, the dollar value of
wetlands worldwide was estimated at $14.9 trillion. Id. An estimated 105 million
acres of wetlands remained in the United States as of 1997. Thomas E. Dahl, Status
and Trends of Wetlands in the Conterminous United States 1986 to 1997, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., 9, http://ibrary.fws.gov/Pubs9/wetlands86-97 lowres.pdf (last vis-
ited May 1, 2011).
9. See Latham, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing Supreme Court's intent in ac-
cepting certiorari in Rapanos).
10. See id. at 16-19 (providing overview of post-Rapanos uncertainty in lower
federal courts).
11. See The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, ENVrL. LAw INsr., 55-61
(2007), available at http://www.elistore.org/reports-detail.asp?ID=11225 (herein-
2
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In United States v. Cundiff (Cundif) ,12 the issue of CWAjurisdic-
tion once again reached the appellate court level through a dispute
related to the dredging and filling of wetlands.' 3 This case offered
the Sixth Circuit another opportunity to address the issue of CWA
jurisdiction over wetlands, having been the appellate court that ad-
dressed it in Rapanos.14 The Sixth Circuit ultimately did not choose
a side in the post-Rapanos debate; however, the court did inject ad-
ditional complexity into CWA jurisdictional analysis.' 5 This com-
plexity arose because the court focused a significant portion of its
analysis on the issue of whether the Rapanos decision can be recon-
ciled with another Supreme Court decision, Marks v. United States
(Marks).16
This Note analyzes the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cundiff Part
II of this Note discusses the factual background and procedural his-
tory of Cundiff'7 Part III provides an overview of the pertinent
CWA sections, the evolution of the Supreme Court precedents de-
fining the scope of the federal government's jurisdiction over wet-
lands, and the post-Rapanos split among the federal circuit courts.18
Part IV describes the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in Cundiff and the
court's focus on a Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis.19 Part V scrutinizes
after The Clean Water Actjurisdictional Handbook] (summarizing federal court hold-
ings on CWA jurisdiction since Rapanos).
12. 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009).
13. See The Clean Water ActJurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 55-57 (pro-
viding overview of appellate court level decisions on CWA jurisdiction since Rapa-
nos). The court's decision in Cundiff demonstrates that common agricultural
dredging activities could very well end up violating the CWA if proper procedures
are not followed. Roger McEowen, SIDECASTING OF DREDGED RIVERBED MATERIAL IS
"POLLUTANT"; CLEAN WATER AcT VIOLATIONS UPHELD, IOWA ST. U. CENTER FOR
AGRIc. L. & TAX'N (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.calt.iastate.edu/riverbed.html.
14. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729-30 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (describing procedural history of Rapanos).
15. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (explaining that Sixth Circuit did not have to
decide which Rapanos test controlled).
16. 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (establishing Supreme Court doctrine for determin-
ing controlling opinion in plurality decisions). In Cundiff the Sixth Circuit sug-
gested that the Rapanos opinion be analyzed using the Marks doctrine; however,
the court then determined that "Rapanos is not easily reconciled with Marks." Cun-
diff 555 F.3d at 210. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit determined that because juris-
diction was proper in Cundiff under both of the tests set forth in Rapanos, they
should "leave ultimate resolution of the Marks-meets-Rapanos debate to a future
case that turns on which test in-fact controls." Id.
17. For further discussion of the facts of Cundiff see infra notes 23-45 and
accompanying text.
18. For further discussion on the legal background of Cundiff see infra notes
46-102 and accompanying text.
19. For a narrative analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cundiff see infta
notes 103-36 and accompanying text.
2872011]
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the outcome of Cundiff and explains that, while the Sixth Circuit
came to a viable conclusion, it injected unnecessary complexity into
CWA jurisdictional analysis. 20 The critique focuses on the practical-
ity of the Sixth Circuit's assertion in Cundiff that a CWA jurisdic-
tional issue could arise that would satisfy the Rapanos plurality's test,
but somehow fail to satisfy the broader test.set forth by Justice Ken-
nedy's concurrence. 21 Lastly, Part VI discusses the impact of Cun-
diff on CWA jurisdictional analysis, and the larger impact that this
uncertain area of the law is having on important American
industries.22
II. FACTS
In 1990, Rudy Cundiff (Cundiff) bought a tract of land con-
taining approximately eighty-five acres of wetlands.2 3 Shortly after
purchasing the land, Cundiff began excavating drainage ditches
and clearing trees to make the newly acquired wetlands arable.24
Upon discovering the drainage ditches, filled-in wetlands, and
cleared land in October 1991, the Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps) and the Kentucky Division of Water suspected that Cundiff
had violated the CWA.2 5 Cundiff had not obtained the proper per-
mit, required under section 404 of the CWA, to conduct dredging
and filling operations.26 It also appeared to the Corps that Cundiff
20. For a critical analysis of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cundiff see infra
notes 137-202 and accompanying text.
21. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209-10 (explaining hypothetical situation in which
Rapanos plurality and dissent would agree that federal government has jurisdiction
under CWA, butJustice Kennedy would disagree). This hypothetical situation re-
lied upon by the Sixth Circuit in Cundiffwas first identified by the Seventh Circuit.
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006).
22. For further discussion of the impact of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Cun-
diff see infra notes 203-26 and accompanying text.
23. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 204 (describing first portion of wetlands at issue in
case). The water in the wetlands purchased by Cundiff was exceptionally acidic
and had an orangish-to-reddish color because of runoff from a nearby abandoned
coal mine. Id. Cundiff was aware of the runoff and discolored water when he
purchased the land. Id.
24. See id. (discussing onset of Cundiff's dredging and filling operations).
25. See id. (recounting government's initial suspicions that Cundiff was violat-
ing CWA procedures).
26. See id. (describing Cundiffs failure to obtain proper legal permit to en-
gage in dredging and filling operations). Section 404 of the CWA regulates the
discharge of dredged material into the waters of the United States, which includes
wetlands. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006). Activities regulated under section 404 include
fill for development, water resource projects (e.g., dams and levees), infrastructure
development (e.g., highways), and mining projects. See Wetland Regulatory Author-
ity, EPA, http://water.epa.gov/grants-funding/wetlands/upload/2004_4_30_wet
lands.reg-authority-pr.pdf (last visited May 1, 2011) [hereinafter Wetland Regula-
4
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was illegally placing the dredged material into the wetlands as filler,
an activity known as "sidecasting."27 Accordingly, the Corps sent
Cundiff a cease-and-desist letter prohibiting him from placing any
additional material into the wetlands without a federal permit.28
Federal and state officials met with Cundiff in 1992 after he
disregarded the Corps's cease-and-desist letter and continued his
dredging and filling operations.29 Unsuccessful attempts to negoti-
ate with Cundiff led the Corps to refer the matter to the EPA and,
over the next several years, Cundiff continued to ignore all direc-
tives from the EPA and the Corps.30 In 1997, the EPA issued an
Order of Compliance to inform Cundiff of his CWA violation and
direct him to immediately cease the discharge of all pollutants into
the wetlands.3 The EPA specifically stated that Cundiff violated
the CWA by "depositing fill material into waters of the United States
without authorization."3 2
Cundiff's son, Seth Cundiff, purchased a tract of land north of
his father's tract in 1998 that contained approximately 100 acres of
wetlands.33 Seth Cundiff proceeded to lease this land to his fa-
ther.34 After Cundiff began excavating and clearing this newly ac-
tory Authority]. "Section 404 requires a permit before dredged or fill material may
be discharged into waters of the United States." Id.
27. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 204-05 (describing nature of Cundiff's CWA viola-
tion). Sidecasting is "the deposit of dredged or excavated material from a wetland
back into the same wetland." See United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir.
2000). "[T]he Clean Water Act's definition of discharge as 'any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters' encompasses sidecasting." Id. at 337.
28. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 205 (describing initial government action taken to
stop Cundiff's illegal activities).
29. See id. (discussing government attempts to negotiate with Cundiff).
30. See id. (describing how Corps referred Cundiff's matter to EPA). The
roles and responsibilities of the EPA and Corps with respect to section 404 of the
CWA differ in scope. See Wetland Regulatory Authority, supra note 26. The Corps
administers the day-to-day program, which includes making permit decisions, con-
ducts jurisdictional determinations, and develops policy and guidance. Id. The
EPA develops and interprets the "policy, guidance, and environmental criteria
used to evaluate permit applications," determines the scope of geographic jurisdic-
tion, determines the applicability of exemptions, reviews permit applications, and
"has the authority to prohibit, deny, or restrict the use of any defined area as a
disposal site." Id. Both the Corps and the EPA enforce the CWA section 404 provi-
sions. Id.
31. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 205 (discussing initial actions taken by EPA against
Cundiff).
32. Id. (explaining nature of Cundiff's CWA violation).
33. See id. (describing tract of land purchased by Seth Cundiff).
34. See id. (detailing involvement of Cundiffs son in CWA violations). The
adjacent tracts of land owned by Rudy and Seth Cundiff are located in Muhlen-
berg County, Kentucky. Id. at 204. These properties sit next to Pond Creek and
Caney Creek, both of which are tributaries of the Green River. Id. The Green
River, a tributary of the Ohio River, is "one of Kentucky's largest, longest, and most
2892011]
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quired land, the EPA informed him in October 1998 that he
needed a permit for this location as well.3 5 The EPA subsequently
issued additional Orders of Compliance to both Cundiffs, requiring
them to cease all operations and restore the wetlands by filling in
the ditches they had dug.3 6
The Cundiffs ignored the EPA's orders and, ultimately, the
government sued them for allegedly violating CWA section 301 (a)
by discharging pollutants into waters of the United States without a
permit.37 In response, the Cundiffs made several counterclaims
against the government.38 They alleged that the government's ac-
tions constituted an uncompensated taking without due process
under the Fifth Amendment; that the government owed them a
duty to mitigate damage to their land caused by runoff from a
nearby mine; and that the government committed a tort against
them by failing to fix the mine runoff problem.39
In 2007, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Kentucky found both Cundiff and his son liable for the al-
leged CWA violations, and the court permanently enjoined them
from discharging dredged material into waters of the United
States.40 The district court imposed additional injunctive relief in
the form of a restoration plan and imposed a civil penalty.4 1 While
navigable rivers. It flows west creating Green River Lake and draining twelve coun-
ties before emptying into the Ohio River. . . ." River Facts, AM. RIvERs, http://www.
americanrivers.org/library/river-facts/river-facts.html (last visited May 1, 2011).
35. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 205 (describing Cundiffs actions on second tract
of land and EPA's response). Cundiff was aware that he needed a permit; how-
ever, he continued his operations anyway because he did not think he would be
issued a permit if he applied. Id. Cundiff completed a two-hundred foot ditch
through the wetlands that extended to Caney Creek, "sidecasting" the dredged
material in order to help dry out the wetlands and allow the land to be farmed. Id.
36. See id. (discussing nature of EPA's warnings to Rudy and Seth Cundiff).
37. See id. (describing initiation of litigation against Rudy and Seth Cundiff).
The government sought injunctive relief and civil penalties against the Cundiffs
for their alleged violations of CWA section 301(a). Id. Section 301 (a) of the CWA
states that "the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful," unless
permitted by an exemption. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). One such exemption is a
section 404(a) permit. See id. § 1344. Section 404 is the exemption which autho-
rizes the Secretary of the Army, via the Corps, to issue permits for the discharge of
dredged or fill material. Id.
38. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 216 (explain how Cundiffs brought counterclaims
against government).
39. See id. (summarizing Cundiffs' counterclaims against government).
40. See id. at 205 (describing district court's holding). The district court
granted the government's motion for summary judgment, finding the Cundiffs
liable. Id. The district court had concluded that the Cundiffs' wetlands were, in
fact, waters of the United States. Id.
41. See id. (describing penalty imposed on Cundiffs). The district court im-
posed a $225,000 civil penalty on the Cundiffs; however, the court suspended all
6
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the case was on appeal, the Supreme Court again addressed the
scope of the term waters of the United States in Rapanos.42 Follow-
ing the Rapanos decision, the parties jointly moved for a limited
remand on the issue of jurisdiction over wetlands, and the district
court again held that the Cundiffs' wetlands were waters of the
United States.4 3 The Cundiffs subsequently appealed the district
court's summary judgment order, imposition of the civil penalty
and injunctive relief, and dismissal of their counterclaims." On ap-
peal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed all challenged aspects of the district
court's judgment.45
III. BACKGROUND
This case is one in a long line of cases analyzing CWAjurisdic-
tion, including three Supreme Court decisions. 46 The issue on ap-
peal in Cundiffwas whether the wetlands in question were waters of
the United States within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, as amended by the CWA of
1977, and in the wake of Rapanos, the Supreme Court's most recent
and controversial decision on the subject.4 7 The term waters of the
United States is important because it is the statutory definition of
but $25,000 of the penalty as long as the Cundiffs implemented a court-ordered
restoration plan. Id. The district court also dismissed each of the Cundiffs' coun-
terclaims. Id. at 216. In October 2008, the EPA's Senior Wetland Enforcement
Expert conducted a site visit of the Cundiff property and documented that new
dredging and filling activities had occurred. See United States v. Cundiff No.
4:01CV-6-M, 2010 WL 5345436, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 8, 2010). As a result of this
inspection, the United States filed a motion with the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky to reinstate the suspended $200,000 portion
of the civil penalty against Cundiff and impose additional restoration measures.
See id. The EPA expert testified that he also found that the existing ditches at the
site had been tripled in depth and were now draining the wetlands into Pond
Creek. See id. at *2. In response, Cundiff testified that he did not dig any new
ditches and only performed routine maintenance on the existing ditches on his
property. See id. In December 2010, the district court granted the government's
motion in part, reinstating $25,000 of the suspended civil penalty against Cundiff
and modifying the restorations measures. See id. at *4.
42. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 205 (describing timing of Cundiffs' appeal to Sixth
Circuit with respect to Supreme Court decision in Rapanos).
43. See id. (explaining district court affirmation ofjudgment against Cundiffs
on limited remand).
44. See id. at 205-06 (relating nature of Cundiffs' appeal to Sixth Circuit).
45. See id. at 204 (discussing Sixth Circuit's affirmation of district court's
holding).
46. See The Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 11 (sum-
marizing history of Supreme Court involvement in determining scope of CWA
jurisdiction).
47. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 204 (explaining question presented in Cundiff).
2011] 291
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"navigable waters," which are the only waters the EPA and Corps
may assert jurisdiction over under the CWA.4 8
Since the CWA's enactment, the Supreme Court has addressed
the statutory definition of navigable waters three times, and to-
gether these cases form the framework for analyzing the scope of
federal jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA.49 In its most re-
cent opinion on the subject, the fractured ruling in Rapanos, the
Supreme Court set forth two very different tests for determining
whether a wetland is within CWAjurisdiction.50 These dueling ap-
proaches have caused significant confusion among the lower fed-
eral courts in CWAjurisdictional cases, even when applied to fairly
straightforward facts.51
A. The Clean Water Act
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments in 1972, more commonly referred to as the CWA, in
an attempt "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bi-
ological integrity of the Nation's waters."52 The heart of the CWA
lies in section 301, which prohibits the discharge of any pollutant
without permission under one of the existing permit schemes.53
The CWA broadly defines discharge as the addition of any pollutant
into navigable waters. 54 The term navigable waters is further de-
fined as "waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas."55
The Supreme Court has focused on this statutory definition of
navigable waters in its attempt to define the scope of federal juris-
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006) (defining navigable waters).
49. See The Clean Water ActJurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 11 (discuss-
ing evolution of framework used for analyzing CWA jurisdictional issues).
50. See id. at 13-14 (providing overview of conflicting jurisdictional tests estab-
lished by Supreme Court in Rapanos).
51. See Latham, supra note 3, at 16-17 (describing post-Rapanos uncertainty
among lower federal courts). The approaches taken by lower federal courts in the
aftermath of Rapanos have varied greatly. Id. Some courts have held that the test
set forth by Justice Kennedy is controlling, while other courts have followed the
dissent's recommendation to find jurisdiction if either test is met. Id. at 17-18.
One court, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
decided not to apply Rapanos because of its lack of guidance and instead looked to
existing precedent within the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 18.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (stating CWA's purpose).
53. See The Clean Water Actjurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 6 (provid-
ing history and overview of CWA).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2010) (defining "discharge of pollutant").
55. Id. § 1362(7) (defining navigable waters).
8
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diction under sections 301 and 404 of the CWA.56 Section 404 of
the CWA, an exception to the section 301 prohibition on discharg-
ing pollutants, authorizes the Secretary of the Army, via the Corps,
to issue permits for "the discharge of dredged or fill material into
the navigable waters at specified disposal sites."57 The Corps and
the EPA share responsibility for implementing and enforcing sec-
tion 404.58 After the Rapanos decision, the EPA and the Corps
issued a joint-agency guidance memorandum in order to help
ensure consistency in jurisdictional determinations and permit-
ting actions.59 In Cundiff it was the defendants' continued failure
56. See The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 8-9 (dis-
cussing ambiguity of term waters of the United States). The Supreme Court has
recognized that Congress intended, via the CWA, to regulate at least some waters
that would not be deemed navigable in the classical understanding of the term.
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985). The Corps
and the EPA have also both issued equivalent regulations defining the term waters
of the United States. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2010); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2010).
These definitions include not only traditional navigable waters, but also tributaries
of traditional navigable waters and wetlands adjacent to covered waters. See 33
C.F.R. §§ 328.3(a) (1), 328 (3) (a) (5), 328 (a) (7) (2010).
57. The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 6-7 (explain-
ing how CWA section 404 acts as exception to section 301 prohibition of discharg-
ing pollutants). There are two major exceptions to the prohibition on discharging
pollutants. Id. at 6. The first exception, section 402 of the CWA, authorizes the
EPA, or a state with an approved program, to issue a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit for the discharge of pollutants other than
dredged or fill material. 33. U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). The second exception, section
404, allows the Corps to issue permits for the discharge of dredged or fill material
at specified disposal sites. Id. § 1344. The Cundiffs should have sought a section
404 permit in the present case. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 204-05.
58. See Wetland Regulatory Authority, supra note 26 (providing overview of Corps
and EPA responsibilities with respect to enforcing CWA provisions).
59. See Clean Water Act jurisdiction Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States, EPA, 3 (Dec. 2, 2008), http:/
/water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/upload/2008_12_3_wetlandsCWA_
Jurisdiction Following-Rapanosl20208.pdf [hereinafterjoint Agency Guidance] (ex-
plaining approach taken by Corps and EPA in wake of Rapanos confusion). The
EPA and Corps issued a joint-agency guidance memorandum in 2008 to ensure
consistency in jurisdictional determinations and permitting actions. See id. Essen-
tially, the federal agencies have chosen to follow the Rapanos dissent's either/or
approach and have directed their entities in the field to assert jurisdiction if either
the Rapanos plurality test or Justice Kennedy's test is met. See id. at 1. The joint-
agency guidance also adopted Justice Kennedy's concept of similarly situated wet-
lands and "interprets the phrase to mean all wetlands that are adjacent to the same
tributary." See Joshua C. Thomas, Clearing the Muddy Waters? Rapanos and the Post-
Rapanos Clean Water ActJurisdictional Guidance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1491, 1528 (2008).
By assessing the effects that all wetlands along a tributary might have on the down-
stream navigable waters, the agencies are able to "exercise jurisdiction in many
close cases where the direct affect of the targeted wetlands themselves is questiona-
ble or speculative." See id. The joint-agency guidance is a "predictable response"
from the agencies following the decision in Rapanos because "the guidance closely
tracks the language of the Court's opinion-as it must-yet takes every opportunity to
retain as much jurisdiction as possible." See id. at 1528-29.
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to obtain a section 404 permit that led the government to file
Suit.6 0
B. The Supreme Court's Evolving Definition of CWA
Jurisdiction and its Fractured Position in Rapanos
In 1985, the Supreme Court first addressed the subject of CWA
jurisdiction as it pertains to section 404 in United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside Bayview) .61 In this case, the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether federal jurisdiction under the CWA
authorized the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits prior
to discharging dredged or fill material into wetlands located adja-
cent to waters of the United States. 62 The Court unanimously held
that wetlands adjacent to traditional navigable waters fell within the
scope of the CWA and no inquiry beyond the showing of adjacency
was required.63 The Court reasoned that Congress, by defining nav-
igable waters to mean waters of the United States, intended to use
its constitutional authority "under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late at least some waters that would not be deemed 'navigable'
under the classical understanding of that term."6 4 This decision
provided clear guidance to both regulators and the regulated com-
munity regarding a limited aspect of federal jurisdiction over
wetlands. 65
60. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 204-05 (noting that failure by Cundiff to obtain
section 404 permit led to litigation).
61. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
62. Id. (describing question presented to Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview).
63. See RAPANOs v. UNITED STATES, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining that under Riverside Bayview, assertion ofjurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters is sustainable by showing adjacency
alone). "The term adjacent means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring. Wet-
lands separated from other waters of the United States by man-made dikes or barri-
ers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like are 'adjacent wetlands.'" 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(B) (2010).
64. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985)
(providing Supreme Court's rationale for finding government jurisdiction over
wetlands under CWA).
65. See Latham, supra note 3, at 8 (explaining how Supreme Court provided
clear guidance on CWA jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview). The Supreme Court
found there to be jurisdiction in Riverside Bayview for three reasons. Id. at 7-8.
First, the Court recognized the difficulty in drawing the line between waters and
wetlands when assessing whether an area is to be considered waters of the United
States. Id. at 7. Therefore, the Court found the Corps assertion of jurisdiction
based on its interpretation of legislative history reasonable. Id. Second, the Court
acknowledged that Congress intended the CWA to be interpreted broadly by defin-
ing navigable waters as waters of the United States. Id. at 8. Finally, the Court
appeared to defer to the technical expertise of Corps. Id.
10
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Despite the Court's guidance regarding wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters, Riverside Bayview did not explicitly address
whether waters or wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters fell
under the CWA'sjurisdiction.66 The Supreme Court addressed this
precise issue in 2001, when it decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) .67 In a five-to-
four decision, the Court rejected the Corps's interpretation that
CWA section 404(a) conferred federal authority over an isolated
body of water that served as a habitat for migratory birds. 68 The
Corps had issued a regulation in 1977 that defined the term waters
of the United States to include "isolated wetlands and lakes, inter-
mittent streams, prairie potholes, and other waters that are not part
of a tributary system to interstate waters or to navigable waters of
the United States, the degradation or destruction of which could
affect interstate commerce."69 The Corps argued that Congress was
aware of this more expansive definition when it passed amend-
ments to the CWA in 1977, and that Congress's failure to overturn
the extension of jurisdiction indicated acceptance of this definition
of waters of the United States.70 The Supreme Court, however,
held that the Corps provided no persuasive evidence that congres-
sional silence demonstrated acquiescence to the Corps's claim of
jurisdiction over non-navigable, isolated, intrastate waters.71
The SWANCC Court ultimately set the stage for the issue that
arose in Rapanos by deciding not to take the next step in expanding
66. See id. at 9 (discussing scope of holding in Riverside Bayview).
67. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
68. See id. at 174 (describing Supreme Court rationale for denying jurisdiction
under CWA). In SWANCC, the Corps attempted to assert CWAjurisdiction over an
isolated pond located entirely within the state of Illinois. Id. at 164. In a 1986
attempt to clarify the reach of its jurisdiction, the Corps stated that section 404(a)
extends to intrastate waters "which are or would be used as habitat by other migra-
tory birds which cross state lines." Id. This provision was subsequently dubbed the
"Migratory Bird Rule." Id. The Supreme Court struck down the Migratory Bird
Rule in SWANCC for being "beyond the grant of congressional authority provided
to the Corps in section 404" of the CWA. See Latham, supra note 3, at 9.
69. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining basis for Corps's assertion that
CWA jurisdiction covered isolated wetlands).
70. See id. at 169 (discussing Corps's assertion that Congress implicitly ap-
proved its claim that CWA covered isolated wetlands).
71. See id. at 170 (stating that Supreme Court was not persuaded by Corps's
claim under Migratory Bird Rule). In denying the Corps's claims, the Court
stated, "[w]e conclude that respondents have failed to make the necessary showing
that the failure of the 1977 House bill demonstrates Congress' [s] acquiescence to
the Corps'[s] regulations or the 'Migratory Bird Rule,' which, of course, did not
first appear until 1986." Id.
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federal jurisdiction over wetlands under the CWA.72 Riverside
Bayview established that the federal government had jurisdiction
over wetlands adjacent to waters of the United States under the
CWA, and SWANCC established that isolated and intrastate waters
and wetlands did not fall under federal jurisdiction.7 3 Given these
outer limits on federal jurisdiction, the issue that naturally followed
was what to do about wetlands that are neither clearly adjacent nor
clearly isolated.74 Rapanos provided the Court with an opportunity
to directly address this grey area.75
In 2006, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the scope of
federal jurisdiction under the CWA through the Rapanos decision.76
The question presented in Rapanos was whether the CWA allowed
the EPA and the Corps to assert jurisdiction over wetlands that did
not contain, nor were adjacent to, traditional navigable waters.77 In
a four-to-one-to-four plurality opinion, five Justices agreed to over-
turn the lower courts' decisions that favored the government's al-
leged CWA jurisdiction.78 The four dissenting Justices argued that
the Corps's determination that the wetlands at issue constituted wa-
72. See id. at 171-72 (describing Supreme Court's rationale for not expanding
federal jurisdiction under CWA). The Court stated that they "decline respon-
dents' invitation to take what they see as the next ineluctable step" after Riverside
Bayview by "holding that isolated ponds, some only seasonal, wholly located within
two Illinois counties, fall under § 404(a)'s definition of 'navigable waters' because
they serve as habitat for migratory birds." Id.
73. See Latham, supra note 3, at 10 (explaining how Supreme Court in
SWANCC clearly found outer limit to federal jurisdiction under CWA).
74. See id. (discussing outer limit to federal government's CWA jurisdiction).
75. See The Clean Water ActJurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 13 (discuss-
ing nature of question presented to Supreme Court in Rapanos).
76. See Latham, supra note 3, at 13 (explaining how Supreme Court intended
to use Rapanos to clarify CWA jurisdictional questions left open by Riverview Bayside
and SWANCC).
77. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (discussing question presented in case). In Rapanos, an issue arose when
a landowner filled in wetlands on his land in Michigan in order to develop the
land. Id. at 720. The land in question consisted of fifty-four acres of wetlands with
the nearest navigable water eleven to twenty miles away. Id. Regulators had in-
formed the owner that his saturated fields were considered waters of the United
States and that he therefore could not deposit fill material on them without a
section 404 permit. Id. The Supreme Court in Rapanos had consolidated two simi-
lar cases out of the Sixth Circuit addressing CWA jurisdiction over wetlands, the
other case being Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 729. In Carabell, the petitioners were denied a section 404 permit to deposit
fill material in a wetland on their property and subsequently challenged the gov-
ernment's regulatory jurisdiction over their land. Id. at 730. The Sixth Circuit
held that there was proper federal jurisdiction because the wetland in question was
"adjacent to neighboring tributaries of navigable waters." Id.
78. See The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 13 (discuss-
ing sharply divided Supreme Court decision in Rapanos).
12
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ters of the United States was a reasonable agency interpretation of
the CWA entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron) .7
Although five Justices agreed to reverse the lower court deci-
sions, they could not agree on the proper jurisdictional test to apply
in future CWA cases.80 The four-Justice plurality decision, written
by Justice Scalia, interpreted the CWA as applicable to "relatively
permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water" con-
nected to traditional navigable waters, as well as wetlands with a
"continuous surface connection" to such bodies of water.81 Justice
Kennedy wrote a solo opinion concurring in the judgment to re-
mand the cases, but also establishing a different jurisdictional test
based on his interpretation of the CWA.82
Justice Kennedy's approach interprets the CWA as covering
wetlands that "possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or
were navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made."8 3 Wet-
lands establish a "significant nexus," and fall within the definition
of waters of the United States, if they "either alone or in combina-
tion with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of navigable wa-
ters.84 Under Justice Kennedy's proposed test, when the effects of
79. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). What has come to be known as "Chevron deference"
is based on the notion that when Congress delegates an agency the authority to
implement a statute, often referred to as the agency's organic statute, Congress
also implicitly delegates authority to interpret that statute. See id. at 865-66. Addi-
tionally, when Chevron applies, it instructs courts to ask two questions: 1) "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue" by applying tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction and 2) if Congress has not, "whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." See id. at
842-43. In Rapanos, the dissent argued that the Corps's decision to treat the wet-
lands as encompassed within the term waters of the United States was a "quintes-
sential example of the Executive's reasonable interpretation of a statutory
provision" under Chevron. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788.
80. See The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 14 (provid-
ing overview of conflicting CWA jurisdictional tests set forth by Supreme Court in
Rapanos).
81. United States v. Cundiff 555 F.3d 200, 207 (6th Cir. 2009) (discussing Rapa-
nos plurality opinion). The Rapanos plurality's test rests on two premises: first, that
Congress presumably intended the term waters to mean only "relatively perma-
nent, standing or flowing bodies of water," and second, that the Riverside Bayview
finding ofjurisdiction "over adjacent wetlands 'rested upon an inherent ambiguity'
in defining where water ends and abutting, or adjacent, wetlands begin." The Clean
Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 14.
82. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 207 (providing overview ofJustice Kennedy's juris-
dictional test from Rapanos).
83. Id. (describing basis of Justice Kennedy's significant nexus jurisdictional
test).
84. Id. (discussing Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test).
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wetlands on water quality are "speculative or insubstantial," they fall
outside of the statutory definition of navigable waters.85
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, argued that the Court
should have followed the Riverside Bayview precedent and the
Court's application of Chevron deference.86 Essentially, this ap-
proach meant the dissent felt compelled to defer to the Corps's
judgment concerning its jurisdiction under the CWA.87 Addition-
ally, the dissent suggested that because the plurality and Justice
Kennedy proposed different tests, CWA jurisdiction exists if either
test is met.8 8
C. Post-Rapanos Fallout and Confusion
Since the release of the Rapanos decision in June 2006, there
have been nearly thirty cases in federal courts demonstrating the
difficulty of applying the tests set forth in Rapanos.8 9 Ten cases have
been decided by a U.S. Court of Appeals, with the most recent,
Precon Development Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Precon),90
decideded by the Fourth Circuit on January 25, 2011.91 In general,
the decisions from lower courts have followed either Justice Ken-
nedy's test or followed the dissent's more liberal approach. 92
In United States v. Robison (Robison)," the Eleventh Circuit held
that CWA jurisdiction may only be established under Justice Ken-
nedy's test.94 The Ninth Circuit, in Northern California River Watch v.
85. Id. (explaining limits to significant nexus test).
86. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (asserting that Chevron deference should have been applied in Rapanos).
87. See id. (asserting that Rapanos was "quintessential example" of case in
which Court should defer to agency judgment under Chevron).
88. See id. at 810 (explaining that in wake of Rapanos split, CWA jurisdiction
should be found if either plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied).
89. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (providing list of post-Rapanos fed-
eral court decisions on subject of CWA jurisdiction).
90. No. 09-2239, 2011 WL 213052 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011).
91. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (listing post-Rapanos circuit court
decisions). In Precon, the developer of a planned 658-acre project in Virginia
sought to develop residential building lots on a site in which 4.8 acres of wetlands
would potentially be impacted by the development. See Precon Dev. Corp., 2011 WL
213052, at *1. Precon submitted two separate permit applications under CWA sec-
tion 404, but the Corps concluded that some of the wetlands were subject tojuris-
diction under the CWA. Id. at *2. When Precon appealed the decision, the Corps
denied Precon's permit application to impact the wetlands and litigation ensued.
Id.
92. See Latham, supra note 3, at 18 (describing approach usually taken by
lower federal courts in wake of Rapanos).
93. 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).
94. See United States v. Cundiff 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009) (describing
Eleventh Circuit's approach to interpreting cases under Rapanos). The Eleventh
14
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City of Healdsburg (River Watch) ' and the Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. (Gerke) ,96 took similar positions and
held that Justice Kennedy's test was in fact controlling.9 7 Most re-
cently, the Fourth Circuit held in Precon thatJustice Kennedy's "sig-
nificant nexus test undisputedly controls."98
In contrast, the First Circuit, in United States v. Johnson (John-
son),99 followed the Rapanos dissent's approach and held that juris-
diction exists if either the plurality test or Justice Kennedy's test are
met.100 In Cundiff the district court followed this latter approach,
largely relying on the First Circuit's rationale.10 Ultimately, the
Sixth Circuit chose not to favor one test over the other because the
result would have been the same under either test.102
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Cundiff the Sixth Circuit focused primarily on the current
state of CWA jurisdictional limits following Rapanos and whether
the Cundiffs' actions did in fact violate the CWA based on the tests
Circuit held thatJustice Kennedy's significant nexus test was "the governing defini-
tion of 'navigable waters' under Rapanos." United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208,
1222 (11th Cir. 2007).
95. 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007).
96. 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006).
97. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (describing approach Ninth and Seventh Cir-
cuits took to interpret cases under Rapanos). The Ninth Circuit has stated that
Justice Kennedy's approach applies in most instances. Id. Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit has held that under Justice Kennedy's test, a significant nexus may be in-
ferred when wetlands are adjacent to navigable waters. See River Watch, 496 F.3d at
1000. In Gerke, the government brought action against a real estate developer for
discharging pollutants without a permit. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at 723.
98. See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 09-2239, 2011 WL
213052, at *8 (4th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011) (explaining Fourth Circuit's position that
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test undisputedly controls CWA jurisdictional
analysis with respect to wetlands).
99. 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006). In Johnson, the government filed a civil suit
against cranberry farmers in Massachusetts for discharging pollutants into feder-
ally-regulated waters without a permit. Id. at 58. The First Circuit upheld jurisdic-
tion over the farmers' land under the CWA and stated thatJustice Stevens's dissent
in Rapanos was the correct approach to take in these cases. Id. at 66.
100. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining Rapanos dissent's position that CWA jurisdiction should be found
if either plurality's or Justice Kennedy's test is met).
101. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (describing how district court in Cundiff re-
lied on First Circuit's interpretation of Rapanos).
102. See id. (explaining why Sixth Circuit chose not to favor one Rapanos test
over other). It could be argued that the Sixth Circuit implicitly approved of the
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established by the Court.103 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit took the
opportunity to comment on the Supreme Court's fragmented posi-
tion in Rapanos.04 Specifically, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the Su-
preme Court's conflicting guidance using instructions the Court
had previously issued for such a situation in Marks.05
A. Application of Rapanos
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by tracing the history of the
CWA, focusing particularly on the statutory definition of navigable
waters as waters of the United States. 06 The court then turned to
whether the Cundiffs' wetlands fell within this definition, and thus
under the jurisdiction of the EPA and Corps.'07 After briefly sum-
marizing each of the positions in the Rapanos plurality decision, the
court noted that difficulty arises not so much in the application of
any one of the approaches, but rather in determining which, if any,
of the three opinions the lower courts should follow. 08
* The court assessed how other federal courts have applied Rapa-
nos to determine the existence of any consistency or trend; how-
ever, the court found that the other circuits were split.' 09 The court
noted that the district court followed the advice of the Rapanos dis-
103. See id. at 211-13 (describing Sixth Circuit's application of Rapanos tests in
Cundiff). The appellate court reviewed the district court's legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. Id. at 206. Additionally, the court
reviewed the imposition of a monetary penalty and injunctive relief for abuse of
discretion. Id. Finally, the court reviewed the dismissal of Cundiffs counterclaims
de novo. Id.
104. See id. at 208-10 (discussing which Rapanos opinion should be considered
controlling).
105. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (describing Supreme
Court doctrine for determining controlling opinion in plurality). The Sixth Cir-
cuit focused much of its opinion in Cundiff on a discussion on whether Rapanos
could be reconciled with the doctrine established previously by the Supreme Court
in Marks. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208-10.
106. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 206 (describing CWA's history).
107. See id. at 210-12 (analyzing whether Cundiffs' actions violated CWA provi-
sions). The district court found that the Cundiffs' wetlands had a significant nexus
with the Green River by way of its tributaries. Id. at 210-11. The district court
relied on expert testimony to establish that the wetlands in question performed a
significant ecological function in relation to the Green River. Id. at 211. The dis-
trict court also found that the Cundiffs' ditch digging and land clearing negatively
impacted the wetlands and were therefore also impacting the Green River. Id. In
addition to finding a significant nexus, the district court found that a continuous
surface connection existed between the Cundiffs' wetlands and a water of the
United States. Id. at 212. Thus, the district court held that CWA jurisdiction ex-
isted because both of the Rapanos tests were satisfied; the Sixth Circuit subse-
quently affirmed this ruling. Id. at 213.
108. See id. at 207 (providing overview of major opinions in Rapanos).
109. See id. at 208 (explaining current split among federal circuit courts).
16
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sent.o10 Relying primarily on the First Circuit decision in Johnson,
the district court concluded that the government had jurisdiction
under the CWA because one of the two Rapanos tests was met."1
Without any additional persuasive guidance on how to apply Rapa-
nos, the Sixth Circuit turned to the Supreme Court's decision in
Marks, which discussed how to interpret a fragmented decision like
Rapanos, in order to determine which opinion should control.112
B. Marks-meets-Rapanos Analysis
The Sixth Circuit focused much of its analysis in Cundiff on
applying the Supreme Court's 1977 precedent in Marks.113 The
court turned to Marks because of the guidance it provides for a situ-
ation in which five Supreme Court Justices do not assent to the ra-
tionale behind a Court decision." 4 In such a situation, Marks
instructs lower courts to choose the "narrowest" concurring opin-
ion and to ignore dissents." 5 The Sixth Circuit stated that "narrow-
est opinion" refers to the opinion that relies on the "least
doctrinally far-reaching-common ground" among the Justices, and
the opinion that "offers the least change to the law."' 16 The court
observed that applying Marks is typically straightforward because
110. See id. (discussing district court's reliance on First Circuit's rationale in
Johnson). The First Circuit held that, post-Rapanos, the government may seek to
establish CWA jurisdiction under either the Rapanos plurality's test or Justice Ken-
nedy's significant nexus test. See The Clean Water Act jurisdictional Handbook, supra
note 11, at 55.
111. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (relating district court conclusion that Cun-
diff's actions met both Rapanos standards).
112. See id. (offering rationale for conducting Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis).
113. See id. at 208-10 (analyzing Marks). The Sixth Circuit noted that the Su-
preme Court has often commented on the limitation of the Marks doctrine. Id. at
208. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit commented on how Rapanos, in its short life,
has "baffled" the lower courts attempting to apply it. Id.
114. See id. at 208 (discussing why Sixth Circuit turned to Marks analysis in
Cundiff). In Marks, the Supreme Court instructed that "[w]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, the holding may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
115. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (explaining Supreme Court guidance in
Marks).
116. Id. at 209 (interpreting narrowest under Marks doctrine). The Sixth Cir-
cuit analyzed the question "what does 'narrowest' mean?" in an attempt to recon-
cile Rapanos with Marks. Id. at 208-09. The court noted that "contrary to the
assertions by the Cundiffs," Marks does not imply that the narrowest Rapanos opin-
ion is whichever one restricts jurisdiction the most. Id. at 209. The court also
expressed that the government's contrary assertion, that the narrowest opinion is
the one that restricts jurisdiction the least, does not make sense either. Id. The
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one opinion is often the logical subset of other, broader opin-
ions.' 17 The Sixth Circuit warned, however, of the potential situa-
tion in which "one opinion supporting the judgment does not fit
entirely within a broader circle drawn by the others." 18 The court
then asserted that because Rapanos falls into this latter category, the
Marks analysis "breaks down."' 19
The Sixth Circuit based this assertion on two premises.120
First, in most cases where Justice Kennedy votes against CWA juris-
diction, he would gain the support of the Rapanos plurality and thus
command five votes.'12 Second, it is possible forJustice Kennedy to
vote against federal jurisdiction under the CWA while the plurality
finds that such jurisdiction exists.122 This second scenario would
apparently result in the Rapanos dissent joining the Rapanos plural-
ity in outvoting Justice Kennedy eight-to-one.123 This hypothetical
eight-to-one outcome was first mentioned in Gerke, where the Sev-
117. See id. (observing that application of Marks doctrine is straightforward in
some situations). The Sixth Circuit said Marks is workable when one opinion can
be regarded as narrower than the other. Id. When this is not the case, however,
the application of Marks can be "problematic." Id.
118. Id. (warning that Marks Doctrine can be both problematic and
unreliable).
119. See id. (stating that Rapanos should not be considered easily reconciled
with Marks).
120. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209-10 (explaining Sixth Circuit's Marks-meets-
Rapanos rationale). In arguing that Rapanos and Marks cannot easily be reconciled,
the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Gerhe. Id. at
210. In Gerke, the Seventh Circuit became the first court to propose that it is possi-
ble for a situation to arise in which the Rapanos plurality would be joined by the
Rapanos dissent in finding federal jurisdiction under the CWA, while Justice Ken-
nedy would find no jurisdiction under his significant nexus test. See United States v.
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). The Seventh Circuit ap-
pears to have based this hypothetical on Justice Kennedy's observation in Rapanos
that "the merest trickle, if continuous, would count as a 'water' subject to federal
regulation" under the Rapanos plurality's test. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S.
715, 768 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It should be noted that when the Sev-
enth Circuit created this hypothetical situation in Gerhe, it failed to offer a practical
example to illustrate how such a situation may actually occur. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at
723-25. In fact, the Seventh Circuit conceded that it would "be a rare case, so as a
practical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator." Id.
at 725. In Cundiff the Sixth Circuit did not offer any additional rationale in sup-
port of the Seventh Circuit's hypothetical situation; however, the Sixth Circuit
based its entire Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis on the premise that this hypothetical
situation is a valid consideration. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 210.
121. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 210 (explaining first premise Sixth Circuit relied
on in Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis).
122. See id. (explaining second premise Sixth Circuit relied on in Marks-meets-
Rapanos analysis).
123. See id. (describing potential eight-to-one outcome based on hypothetical
situation created by Seventh Circuit in Gerke).
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enth Circuit characterized it as a "rare case" prior to holding that
Justice Kennedy's test was controlling. 124
The Sixth Circuit asserted that it is possible to pass the Rapanos
plurality test with a relatively permanent body of water that has a
continuous surface connection to a wetland, and at the same time
fail Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test.125 Based on this as-
sertion, the court concluded that "Rapanos is not easily reconciled
with Marks."'26 The court decided that it ultimately did not have to
address this Marks-meets-Rapanos issue, however, because the
Cundiffs' situation would pass both the Rapanos plurality test and
Justice Kennedy's test.127
C. Jurisdictional Determination and Summary Judgment
After determining that the Cundiffs' land was subject to federal
jurisdiction under the CWA, the Sixth Circuit applied both Rapanos
tests to demonstrate its conclusion.128 The court found the
Cundiffs' wetlands had a significant nexus with a navigable body of
water, the Green River, via tributaries to that river.129 This conclu-
sion relied on expert testimony that the drainage ditches dug by the
Cundiffs had a "direct and significant" impact on the Green
River.130 The court also found that the Cundiffs' wetlands satisfied
124. For a further discussion of the rare case that the Seventh Circuit first
mentioned in Gerke, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 210 (summarizing result of Sixth Circuit's Marks-
meets-Rapanos analysis).
126. See id. (offering conclusion based on Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis). Af-
ter concluding that Rapanos was not easily reconciled with Marks, the Sixth Circuit
went on to conclude that "jurisdiction is proper here under bothJustice Kennedy's
and the plurality's test, so we leave ultimate resolution of the Marks-meets-Rapanos
debate to a future case that turns on which test in fact controls." Id.
127. See id. (concluding that Marks-meets-Rapanos conundrum does not have
to be resolved because CWA jurisdiction is proper under both Rapanos tests).
128. See id. at 210-13 (applying Rapanos tests to present case).
129. See id. at 210-11 (applying Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test to facts
in Cundiff. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
Cundiffs' wetlands had a significant nexus to the navigable-in-fact Green River via
two tributaries, Pond and Caney Creeks. Id.
130. Cundiff 555 F.3d at 211 (discussing government's reliance on expert tes-
timony to show existence of significant nexus). The expert witness testified that
wetlands in the area perform significant ecological functions in relation to the
Green River and its tributaries. Id. Specifically, the expert testified that the wet-
lands provided both short- and long-term water storage, filtering of acid runoff
from the nearby mine, and a habitat for local plants and wildlife. Id. The district
court found that the Cundiffs' dredging operations undermined the wetlands'
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both prongs of the Rapanos plurality's standard. 31 According to
the court, the Cundiffs' wetlands had a topical flow which con-
nected the wetlands to the tributary of a navigable water. 32 This
connection was also damp enough to be considered a continuous
surface connection because polluting the wetland would have a
"proportionate effect on the traditional waterway."133
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion to grant summary judgment in favor of the government.134
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing remedies consisting of both injunc-
tive relief and civil penalties.135 Finally, the court explained why
the Cundiffs' counterclaims were invalid.136
131. See id. at 211-12 (applying Rapanos plurality's standard to facts in Cun-
difj). The district court in Cundiff held that jurisdiction was proper under the
Rapanos plurality test because the affected tributaries were all "relatively perma-
nent bodies of water connected to a traditional interstate navigable water," satisfy-
ing the first prong of the test. Id. at 211. Additionally, the district court held that
there was evidence of continuous surface connections between the wetlands and
the Green River's tributaries. Id. The Cundiffs argued that there was not a contin-
uous surface connection, but the district court and Sixth Circuit found this argu-
ment unpersuasive. Id. at 212.
132. See id. at 212 (explaining how Cundiffs' wetlands satisfied continuous
surface connection prong of Rapanos plurality's test).
133. Id. at 212-13 (affirming district court's finding that continuous surface
connection existed).
134. See id. (concluding that district court was correct granting summary
judgment).
135. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 213-15 (finding summary judgment in favor of
government proper). To find liability under CWA section 301, the government
had to prove that a person discharged a pollutant from a point source into waters
of the United States without a permit. Id. at 213. The Cundiffs conceded that they
did not have a permit, but they argued that they did not discharge a pollutant and
that they fell into a statutory exception allowing them to operate without a permit.
Id. The government was nevertheless able to show that the fill material that the
Cundiffs were "sidecasting" was in fact a pollutant under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Id.
Additionally, the government showed that the Cundiffs did not qualify for any of
the CWA's statutory exceptions. Id. at 214-15.
136. See id. at 215-18 (concluding that Cundiffs' counterclaims were invalid).
Although the Sixth Circuit found the Cundiffs' counterclaims to be "rather nebu-
lous," it broke them into three categories. Id. at 216. First, the Cundiffs made
Constitutional takings-based counterclaims, asserting that the government's ac-
tions amounted to an uncompensated taking without due process. Id. Second, the
Cundiffs made duty-based counterclaims, asserting that the government had failed
to mitigate damage caused to their land by mine runoff. Id. Finally, the Cundiffs
made tort-based counterclaims, asserting that the government failed to fix known
problems with the nearby mine. Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that each of the
Cundiffs' counterclaims failed as a matter of law. Id.
20




The Sixth Circuit's analysis of federal jurisdiction under the
CWA avoided determining which Rapanos test is controlling.'37 Al-
though the court ultimately reached a viable conclusion that the
Cundiffs' wetlands should be subject to CWA jurisdiction, it did so
only after laboring through an unnecessarily complicated analysis
of whether Rapanos can be reconciled with Marks.'38 Specifically,
the Sixth Circuit's focus on the rare case in which an eight-to-one
outcome may arise, first mentioned by the Seventh Circuit in Gerke,
complicated the court's overall analysis of the Rapanosjurisdictional
tests as viewed through the lens of the Marks doctrine. 39
A. The Sixth Circuit's Unnecessary Analysis
Based on the facts of Cundiff neither the district court nor the
Sixth Circuit had a difficult time proving that the Cundiffs violated
the CWA by polluting their wetlands without the proper permit.140
Under both the Rapanos plurality's test and Justice Kennedy's test,
the Cundiffs would have been liable and forced to face the legal
consequences.141 What is questionable, however, is.why the court
proceeded to conduct significant analysis outside of showing that
the elements of the two Rapanos tests were satisfied. 142 Instead of
simply applying both tests to Cundiff s facts and concluding that the
same result would occur regardless of which test controls, the court
chose to comment on the current state of "bafflement" that the
Rapanos decision has caused lower courts.143 In doing so, particu-
larly through its Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis, the Sixth Circuit has
137. See id. at 208 (explaining why Sixth Circuit did not have to choose side in
post-Rapanos debate). "Fortunately" the court wrote, "jurisdiction is proper here
under each of the primary Rapanos opinions and therefore we do not have to de-
cide here, once and for all, which test controls in all future cases." Id.
138. See id. at 208-10 (describing Sixth Circuit's extensive Marks-meets-Rapa-
nos analysis).
139. For a further discussion of the rare case that the Seventh Circuit first
mentioned in Gerke, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
140. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 213 (providing federal courts' rationale for ap-
proving summary judgment in favor of government).
141. See id. (confirming district court holding that CWA confers jurisdiction
over Cundiffs' land under both Rapanos tests).
142. See id. at 208-10 (summarizing extent to which Sixth Circuit focused on
Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis).
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contributed to the confusion within the growing body of conflicting
case law among lower courts. 144
B. Is it Possible to Pass the Rapanos Plurality Test and Fail
Justice Kennedy's Test?
1. The Hypothetical Eight-to-One Outcome
In addition to holding that federal jurisdiction was proper
under both Rapanos tests, the Sixth Circuit commented on how for-
tunate it was to not have to ultimately reconcile Rapanos with
Marks. 45 While outlining what it viewed as the difficulty in recon-
ciling these two cases, the court made the critical assumption that it
should base its analysis on the hypothetical rare case that the Sev-
enth Circuit raised and then disregarded in Gerke.'4 6 According to
this hypothetical, it is possible under the Rapanos framework for a
scenario to arise in which Justice Kennedy finds no federal jurisdic-
tion under the CWA while the plurality finds that jurisdiction ex-
ists.147 This scenario would seemingly result in the Rapanos dissent
joining the Rapanos plurality, with Justice Kennedy as the sole dis-
sent against CWA jurisdiction.' 48 Although an interesting intellec-
tual exercise, the practicality of this hypothetical is questionable. 4 9
For this hypothetical situation to arise, there must be a rela-
tively permanent body of water with continuous surface connection
144. See Latham, supra note 3, at 16-19 (detailing confusion within lower fed-
eral courts from conflicting jurisdictional tests established by Rapanos).
145. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 210 (discussing Sixth Circuit's position that it did
not have to reconcile Marks with Rapanos).
146. For more on the so-called rare case identified by the Seventh Circuit in
Gerke, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
147. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209-10 (basing Mark-meets-Rapanos analysis on
assumption borrowed from Gerke). The hypothetical situation resulting in an
eight-to-one breakdown ofJustices, with the Rapanos plurality and Rapanos dissent
both finding CWA jurisdiction while Justice Kennedy rejects CWAjurisdiction, was
first proposed by the Seventh Circuit. See Gerke, 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006).
148. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209-10 (discussing potential scenario in which
there is continuous surface connection but no significant nexus).
149. See Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, With Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of
Clean Water Act jurisdiction, in Essays on the Supreme Court's Clean Water Act Juispru-
dence as Reflected in Rapanos v. United States, VT. J. EmArL. LAw 81, 94-95 (2007),
available at http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10004.pdf (asserting that close
reading of Rapanos plurality opinion indicates that hypothetical eight-to-one out-
come is unlikely). In the hypothetical situation created by the Seventh Circuit in
Ger*e, where there is a "wetland connected to a navigable in-fact water by a 'rela-
tively continuous flow' of water that is so inconsequential as to fail to satisfy Justice
Kennedy's requirement of a 'significant nexus,' there is every reason to believe
that it would fail to satisfy the plurality as well." Id. at 95.
22
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to a wetland.15 0 This continuous surface connection would then
need to fail Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test.151 Such failure
requires that polluting the hypothetical wetlands would not "signifi-
cantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the
relatively permanent body of water despite a continuous surface
connection between the polluted wetlands and the body of
water.1 5 2 Although one can argue that it is possible for this situa-
tion to arise, based on the construction of the two Rapanos tests, it
would indeed be a rare case, as the Seventh Circuit noted in
Gerke. 15 3 A question then arises of whether accounting for this rare
case is worth the significant amount of analysis that it requires the
courts to undertake.'54
2. The Breadth of Justice Kennedy's Test
In framing his significant nexus test in Rapanos, Justice Ken-
nedy included some important language that is often not empha-
sized by courts applying his test.'55 In particular, Justice Kennedy
stated, "When... wetlands' effects on water quality are speculative
or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone fairly encompassed by
150. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 211 (providing requirements of Rapanos plural-
ity's CWA jurisdictional test). To establish jurisdiction under the Rapanos plurality
test, the government must show that 1) there is a "relatively permanent" standing
or continuously flowing body of water connected to a traditional navigable water,
and 2) the wetlands in question have a continuous surface connection to those
waters. Id. According to the Rapanos plurality, a relatively continuous flow is a
"necessary condition" for a water to qualify under its test and "not an adequate
condition." See Adler, supra note 149, at 94-95. This explanation means that the
Rapanos plurality would not find CWA jurisdiction if a wetland lacked relatively
continuous flow but still had a continuous surface connection. Id. That is, "the
existence of such a connection, by itself, would not necessarily be enough to estab-
lish such jurisdiction." Id. at 95.
151. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 210 (providing requirements ofJustice Kennedy's
significant nexus CWA jurisdictional test).
152. Adler, supra note 149, at 95 (asserting that hypothetical eight-to-one out-
come in Supreme Court is impossible). "In seeking to drastically limit the reach of
CWA jurisdiction, the Rapanos plurality showed a clear lack of understanding con-
cerning the scientific importance of wetlands. As a result, the plurality was willing
to construe the CWA in a manner that would have resulted in significant ecologi-
cal harm," with many waters falling outside of CWA protection. See Mark A.
Latham, (Un)restoring the Chemical, Physical, and Biological Integrity of Our Nation's
Waters: The Emerging Clean Water Act juisprudence of the Roberts Court, 28 VA. ENJrL.
L.J. 411, 441 (2010).
153. For a further discussion of the rare case first mentioned by the Seventh
Circuit in Gerhe, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
154. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (demonstrating impact of excessive
judicial analysis and litigation in wake of Rapanos).
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the statutory term 'navigable waters."' 15 6 By including this lan-
guage, Justice Kennedy appears to create a very narrow exception
to what constitutes a significant nexus. It follows that under his test,
every continuous surface connection between a wetland and a rela-
tively permanent body of water could be considered a significant
nexus unless it can be proven to be "speculative or insubstantial."15 7
Additionally, Justice Kennedy's test does not require a wetland
to be assessed under the CWA in isolation.'58 A significant nexus
can also exist when wetlands "in combination with similarly situated
lands in the region" significantly affect the "chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of traditional navigable waters." 59 By failing to
define the scope of the "region" to which he was referring, and by
also using the term "aquatic system," it appears Justice Kennedy in-
tended to define this region very broadly. 60 It also suggests that
the cumulative effect of aggregated wetlands can establish a signifi-
cant nexus.' 6 '
The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Precon illustrates an ex-
pansive application of the "similarly situated" wetlands concept.'62
In Precon, the Fourth Circuit held that the Corps acted reasonably
in aggregating 448 acres of non-contiguous wetlands as similarly sit-
uated for the purpose of determining whether a significant nexus
existed.'63 Of the 448 acres of wetlands deemed similarly situated,
only 4.8 acres, or approximately one percent, were actually adjacent
to a tributary of a water of United States. 164
156. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (discussing characteristics of wetlands that will not pass significant nexus
test).
157. See id. at 779-80 (explaining what constitutes significant nexus).
158. See The Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 20-22 (ex-
plaining Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test).
159. Id. at 20 (discussing what Justice Kennedy meant by similarly situated
lands).
160. See id. at 20-21 (discussing breadth ofJustice Kennedy's significant nexus
test).
161. See id. at 20 (explaining extent that wetlands can be aggregated to assess
existence of significant nexus).
162. See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 09-2239, 2011 WL
213052, at *11 (4th Cir.Jan. 25, 2011) (illustrating expansive application ofJustice
Kennedy's concept of similarly situated wetlands).
163. See id. (finding no error in Corps decision to aggregate wetlands in sig-
nificant nexus determination).
164. See id. at *9-11 (upholding Corps decision to aggregate 448 acres of wet-
lands in significant nexus determination).
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3. The Restrictive Nature of the Plurality's Test
For a continuous surface connection to exist under the Rapa-
nos plurality's jurisdictional test, the wetland must directly abut a
tributary or body of water.165 The Rapanos plurality characterized
the Riverside Bayview adjacency test as based on a "boundary-drawing
problem."1 6 6 In describing the plurality's position, Justice Scalia
stated that "only those wetlands with a continuous surface connec-
tion to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own
right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 'waters' and
wetlands, are 'adjacent to' such waters and covered by the Act."1 67
He then described the plurality's test, asserting that establishing
wetlands such as those in Rapanos are covered by the CWA "requires
two findings: first, that the adjacent channel contains a 'watel[r] of
the United States,'. . . and second, that the wetland has a continu-
ous surface connection with that water, making it difficult to deter-
mine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland' begins."168
4. Disregarding the Rare Case
Both the breadth of Justice Kennedy's test and the narrow tex-
tualist aspect of the Rapanos plurality's test indicate that the hypo-
165. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (stating requirements of Rapanos plurality's test).
166. Id. (discussing plurality's reliance on Riverside Bayview).
167. Id. (emphasis added) (describing scope of Rapanos plurality's holding).
168. Id. (stating Rapanos plurality's test); see also, Adler, supra note 149, at 94-
95 (asserting that Rapanos plurality would not find jurisdiction under CWA if wet-
land lacked relatively continuous flow but still had continuous surface connec-
tion). Justice Scalia states in footnote, "[b]ut this does not contradict our
interpretation, which asserts that relatively continuous flow is a necessary condition
for qualification as a 'water,' not an adequate condition." Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 736
n.7 (Scalia,J., plurality opinion). Professor Adler suggests that the plurality's char-
acterization of its own test as a "necessary-but-not sufficient" basis for asserting ju-
risdiction should preclude any claim that an eight-to-one holding is possible. See
Adler, supra note 149, at 94-95. Professor Adler argues further that this language
reinforces that the continuous surface connection must be sufficiently significant
so that it creates a line-drawing problem (i.e., an inability to determine where the
water ends and the wetland begins), and "thus a 'continuous surface connection'
remains a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for jurisdiction under the Scalia
opinion." Jonathan H. Adler, Comment to Applying Rapanos in Cundiff THE
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:36 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/02/08/ap-
plying-rapanos-in-cundiff/. Professor Adler then suggests that, as a practical mat-
ter, "there are unlikely to be any wetlands that would meet this condition but not
satisfy justice Kennedy's opinion." Id. Moreover, if the continuous surface connec-
tion is "substantial enough to create the line-drawing problem that Scalia's opinion
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thetical eight-to-one outcome is likely not possible.169 First, it
appears unlikely that a connection between a wetland and a rela-
tively permanent body of water could be found to be speculative or
insubstantial if that connection was also found to be a continuous
surface connection.170 One would need to argue that the continu-
ous surface connection, the marshy area between the wetland and
the body of water, is so insignificant that any claim of downstream
pollution is speculative or insubstantial.' 7 1 Although possible in
theory, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in Robison, such a situation is
still very unlikely.172 This is especially true considering that under
Justice Kennedy's test, all similarly situated wetlands in the region
would be assessed in conjunction with the continuous surface con-
nection in question. 173
Second, it seems unlikely that the Rapanos plurality would find
CWA jurisdiction in a case where Justice Kennedy does not find a
significant nexus to exist.174 justice Kennedy, in criticizing the plu-
169. For discussion of the breadth ofJustice Kennedy's test compared to the
Rapanos plurality's test, see supra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
170. See Adler, supra note 149, at 95 (commenting on practicality of hypotheti-
cal eight-to-one outcome).
171. See N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir.
2007) (explaining Justice Kennedy's reliance on Riverside Bayview in creating his
significant nexus test). In River Watch, the Ninth Circuit argued that Rapanos's
reaffirmation of the Riverside Bayview holding (i.e., that the CWA covers wetlands
adjacent to navigable waters) allows Justice Kennedy's significant nexus to be in-
ferred when wetlands are adjacent to navigable waters. Id. Additionally, Justice
Scalia's reliance on Riverside Bayviezw in the second prong of the Rapanos plurality
test (i.e., that a wetland has a continuous surface connection with a water when it is
"difficult to determine where the 'water' ends and the 'wetland begins'") makes it
difficult to accept that the Gerke hypothetical situation is possible in a practical
sense. Adler, supra note 149 at 94-95; see also Benjamin v. Douglas Ridge Rifle Club,
673 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220 (D. Or. 2009).
172. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007) (describ-
ing case as one that might fall into category described by Gerke hypothetical). The
Eleventh Circuit stated in Robison that "this case arguably is one in which Justice
Scalia's test may actually be more likely to result in CWAjurisdiction than Justice
Kennedy's test." Id. The court, however, did not go into any additional detail on
this point other than the brief mention of it quoted above. See id. The court stated
that "in factual circumstances different from Rapanos, Justice Scalia's test may be
less restrictive of CWA jurisdiction; however, in determining the governing hold-
ing in Rapanos, we cannot disconnect the facts in the case from the various opin-
ions and determine which opinion is narrower in the abstract." Id. at 1222. This
statement indicates that the Eleventh Circuit may be inclined to follow the Seventh
Circuit's lead and disregard the rare case.
173. See The Clean Water Act Jurisdictional Handbook, supra note 11, at 20-21
(explaining concept of similarly situated wetlands injustice Kennedy's significant
nexus test).
174. See Adler, supra note 149, at 94-95 (explaining why it is unlikely that
Rapanos plurality would find CWA jurisdiction exists when Justice Kennedy finds
jurisdiction does not exist).
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rality's test, actually mentioned the possibility that under Justice
Scalia's approach "[t]he merest trickle, if continuous, would count
as a 'water' subject to federal regulation" under the CWA.'75 Ac-
cording to Justice Kennedy, the plurality's test would permit appli-
cation of the CWA to waters far from those traditionally held to be
under federal authority.176 Justice Scalia, however, acknowledged
this criticism in a footnote and indicated that before he allowed an
agency to assert jurisdiction over wetlands that were "traditionally
local," he would require that Congress clearly authorize the agency
"to do so in statutory text."177 This statement suggests that if faced
with the scenario of a wetland connected to a water of the United
States by a continuous surface connection that was nothing but a
mere trickle, the Rapanos plurality would exclude finding jurisdic-
tion because the statutory text of the CWA would not support it.17 8
The confusion in the lower courts, and the significant amount
of judicial analysis required post-Rapanos, indicate that a simplified
analysis is needed and that excessive considerations and superflu-
ous hypothetical scenarios should be avoided in CWA jurisdictional
analysis.179 Therefore, to the extent that the hypothetical eight-to-
one outcome is possible, this rare case should be disregarded, as
the Seventh Circuit chose to do in Gerke.o80 With the Sixth Circuit's
hypothetical eight-to-one outcome being considered practically im-
possible, the Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis becomes much more
straightforward.1 8 1
175. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 769 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (criticizing justice Scalia's plurality opinion).
176. See id. at 776 (asserting that Rapanos plurality's test will allow jurisdiction
to be found in cases that normally would not be covered by CWA). Notably, this
assertion appears to be what the Seventh Circuit based its hypothetical eight-to-one
outcome in Gerke. See United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th
Cir. 2006).
177. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. at 738 n.9 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(emphasis added) (stating that Rapanos plurality test relies on statutory text).
178. See Mark Moller, Rapanos, Raich, and Agency Discretion, CATO @ LIBERTY
(June 19, 2006, 3:27 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/rapanos-raich-and-
agency-discretion/ (asserting that Justice Scalia would not support hypothetical
eight-to-one Supreme Court outcome because of CWA's statutory text).
179. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (revealing significant amount of
federal litigation caused by post-Rapanos confusion).
180. See Gerke, 464 F.3d at 725 (explaining Seventh Circuit's rationale for dis-
regarding rare case and finding Justice Kennedy's test controlling).
181. See Adler, supra note 149, at 94-95 (asserting that hypothetical eight-to-
one outcome in Supreme Court using Rapanos analysis is not possible). Once the
hypothetical eight-to-one outcome is no longer considered a valid assumption,
then the Rapanos plurality opinion becomes a "logical subset" ofJustice Kennedy's
opinion, and the Marks-meets-Rapanos problems discussed by the Sixth Circuit in
Cundiff are no longer a significant issue. See United States v. Cundiff 555 F.3d 200,
2011] 311
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C. Marks-meets-Rapanos Made Clear
1. The Plurality's Test as a Subset offustice Kennedy's Test
If the hypothetical eight-to-one outcome is assumed to be prac-
tically impossible, then the headaches regarding Marks-meets-Rapa-
nos analysis largely disappear.18 2 The Rapanos plurality test then
appears to be a narrower subset of Justice Kennedy's significant
nexus test, and the Marks doctrine can be applied as the Supreme
Court originally intended.183 Taken literally, Marks "instructs
courts to choose the 'narrowest' concurring opinion and to ignore
dissents."184 As the Sixth Circuit noted, however, "Marks does not
imply that the 'narrowest' Rapanos opinion is whichever one re-
stricts jurisdiction the most," nor is the narrowest opinion the one
that restricts the jurisdiction the least.'85 Instead, the narrowest
opinion refers to the "concurring opinion that offers the least
change to the law." 186 Under the Marks doctrine, as applied after
assuming that the hypothetical eight-to-one outcome is not likely to
occur, Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test would be the least
"doctrinally sweeping" and offers the least change to the current
law.187 This test, therefore, becomes the controlling opinion out of
Rapanos.'8 8
2. A Proposed Two-Pronged Test
IfJustice Kennedy's test is deemed the controlling opinion in
Rapanos, and the Rapanos plurality's test is considered a subset of
Justice Kennedy's test, then it might be possible to utilize both tests
209 (6th Cir. 2009) (outlining significant challenges Sixth Circuit perceived in rec-
onciling Rapanos with Marks).
182. See Adler, supra note 149, at 95 (arguing that hypothetical eight-to-one
outcome in Supreme Court is not actually possible).
183. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209 (discussing importance in plurality opinions
of having one opinion as logical subset of another opinion). The Sixth Circuit
asserts that when "no standard put forth in a concurning opinion (or opinions)
that, together, would equal five votes," then the Marks doctrine breaks down. Id.
184. Id. at 208-09 (explaining literal interpretation of Marks doctrine).
185. See id. at 209 (demonstrating that Rapanos does not reconcile easily with
literal interpretation of Marks doctrine).
186. Id. (explaining that narrowest opinion refers to least doctrinally "far-
reaching-common ground" among Justices in majority).
187. See United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying
Marks doctrine in CWA jurisdictional case). The Marks doctrine makes sense only
when one Supreme Court opinion is truly narrower than another, meaning one
opinion would apply in a subset of cases encompassed by the broader opinion. Id.
188. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208 (discussing current split in circuit courts re-
garding which Rapanos opinion controls). The analysis in this Note ultimately
aligns with the Eleventh Circuit's view that CWA jurisdiction may only be estab-
lished under Justice Kennedy's test from Rapanos. See id.
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in order to create a more practical two-pronged approach.189 This
test's first prong would be the plurality's test, authorizing agencies
to assert jurisdiction over relatively permanent, non-navigable
tributaries of traditional navigable waters and wetlands with a con-
tinuous surface connection with such tributaries. 190 This prong,
which is relatively easy to apply, would serve as the initial filter for
determining CWA jurisdiction.19 1 If an accused polluter's actions
meet this prong, the federal agency can assert jurisdiction under
the CWA. If the accused polluter's actions do not meet this test,
however, the second prong is then invoked. To clear the second
prong and avoid the government's jurisdictional claim, the accused
polluter would then need to survive the significant nexus test.192
This proposed two-pronged test, which is only possible by rec-
onciling the Marks-meets-Rapanos conundrum discussed at length
by the Sixth Circuit, would provide a clear process for courts to
189. See id. at 210 (discussing whether common ground exists between Rapa-
nos plurality andJustice Kennedy). The Sixth Circuit found little common ground
between the plurality's and Justice Kennedy's "conceptions ofjurisdiction" under
the CWA. Id. The plurality claims that Justice Kennedy's test rewrites the statute
while Justice Kennedy claims that the plurality reads nonexistent requirements
into the act. See id. This lack of common ground is likely to preclude any future
compromise position. See id.
190. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (providing overview of plurality opinion).
191. See Joint Agency Guidance, supra note 59, at 3 (explaining approach taken
by Corps and EPA in wake of Rapanos). In December 2008, the EPA and Corps
issued a joint guidance memorandum to clarify procedures for determining juris-
diction under the CWA. Id. at 1. In issuing this guidance, the agencies stated that
they would "continue to monitor implementation of the Rapanos decision in the
field and recognize that further consideration of jurisdictional issues, including
clarification and definition of key terminology, may be appropriate in the future,
either through the issuance of additional guidance or through rulemaking." Id. at
3. The agencies have not provided any more guidance or proposed any rules, but
their existing guidance recommends utilizing both the Rapanos plurality's test and
the significant nexus test, similar to what this Note proposes. Id. at 6. The existing
guidance "essentially blends traditional formalistic analysis with a Rapanos-inspired
functional analysis, relying on Justice Kennedy's functional 'significant nexus' ap-
proach to establish whether Clean Water Act jurisdiction exists over waters that are
'close calls.'" Robin Kundis Craig,justice Kennedy and Ecosystem Services: A Functional
Approach to Clean Water Act Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 38 ENvrL. L. 635, 658 (2008).
The difference between the current agency guidance and this Note is that the
agencies' approach seems to align itself more with the Rapanos dissent's either/or
approach, whereas this Note proposes to use the two tests serially in order to pro-
mote efficiency and avoid unnecessary legal analysis and costly litigation. See Joint
Agency Guidance, supra note 59, at 3.
192. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing re-
quirements of significant nexus test). "Justice Kennedy's test can impose substan-
tial, expensive, and time-consuming evidentiary burdens on federal and state
governments and on citizen plaintiffs, making it more likely that these enforcers
will fail to meet their burden of proof that waters are 'navigable waters' covered by
the Clean Water Act." Kundis Craig, supra note 191, at 664.
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follow when determining whether government action falls within
the jurisdictional scope of the CWA.193 Given the nearly thirty fed-
eral cases on the issue of CWA jurisdiction in the four years since
the Rapanos decision, and the disagreement among the circuit
courts on which Rapanos test controls, it is clear that a more effi-
cient solution than Rapanos is necessary.194
On its face, the proposed two-pronged test appears to be con-
sistent with the Rapanos dissent's either/or approach.195 An impor-
tant distinction between the two-pronged test and the either/or
approach is that the Rapanos dissent stands for much more than
accepting either of the tests proposed by the other five Justices; it
stands for a longstanding position held by many Justices, judges,
and commentators that agencies should have broad discretion in
their ability to regulate.196 Furthermore, the Rapanos dissent's posi-
tion does not eliminate the need for overly complicated judicial
analysis; it merely leaves discretion to the courts to decide how to
rule once faced with a CWA jurisdictional issue. 197 By clarifying the
jurisdictional analysis, the proposed two-pronged test would pro-
vide all the benefits of the dissent's either/or approach without fos-
tering excessive and complicated judicial analysis.198
It is clear from the opinions of both the Rapanos plurality and
Justice Kennedy that there is little common ground between their
opposing conceptions of CWA jurisdiction. 1 99 Therefore, a com-
promise position like the two-pronged test proposed above is un-
likely to come to fruition. Not only would the Rapanos plurality
never consider its test a logical subset of Justice Kennedy's signifi-
193. See United States v. Cundiff 555 F.3d 200, 209-10 (6th Cir. 2009) (explain-
ing Sixth Circuit's Marks-meets-Rapanos rationale).
194. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (providing list of post-Rapanos fed-
eral court decisions).
195. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that CWA
jurisdiction should be found in any future case that meets either Rapanos test).
196. See id. at 788 (applying Chevron to Rapanos). Justice Stevens argued that
the EPA and Corps should have broad discretion under Chevron to interpret the
CWA, meaning the Court should not interfere with the agencies' actions if Con-
gress spoke directly on the issue via the CWA and the agency interpretation of the
CWA is reasonable. Id. The debate among administrative law scholars on the role
and power of federal agencies underlies the entire discussion of CWA jurisdiction
and the divergent positions of the Supreme Court Justices. See id.
197. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (demonstrating scope of litigation
enabled by post-Rapanos confusion).
198. See Joint Agency Guidance, supra note 59, at 3 (providing overview of cur-
rent joint-agency approach). The proposed two-pronged approach would act
more like the joint-agency guidance and provide clear precedent for lower courts
to follow. See id.
199. See United States v. Cundeff 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining
why little common ground exists between Rapanos plurality and Justice Kennedy).
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cant nexus test, but the plurality also would be inclined to further
limit government jurisdiction in future CWA cases. 200
By failing to garner enough Justices to support a majority posi-
tion in Rapanos, the Supreme Court has left an extremely important
area of law in a state of disarray.201 With the Court repeatedly deny-
ing certiorari in similar cases, it appears that a solution cannot be
expected anytime soon.202 Although the impact of this lack of gui-
dance has yet to be fully realized, some initial conclusions can be
made.
VI. IMPACT
Most significantly, Cundiff advanced the notion, first proposed
by the Seventh Circuit in Gerke, that the Rapanos decision cannot be
reconciled with Marks.203 By focusing much of its substantive analy-
sis on the Marks-meets-Rapanos conundrum, and by implicitly con-
200. See id. at 209 (discussing importance in Supreme Court plurality opinion
of having one opinion as logical subset of another). The fact that both the Rapa-
nos plurality and Justice Kennedy viewed each other's opinion as a rewrite of the
CWA's statutory language likely precludes either from ever thinking one opinion is
a logical subset of the other. Id. at 210. In an amicus brief submitted to the Sixth
Circuit, Pacific Legal Foundation actually argued that the plurality's test is a logical
subset of Justice Kennedy's test. See id. at 210 n.2. The Sixth Circuit found this
argument unpersuasive, which is not surprising given its reliance on the hypotheti-
cal situation from Gerke. See id. The Sixth Circuit explained that there is a "theo-
retical possibility" that the tests do not align (i.e., the Gerke hypothetical) and that
another circuit court may have recently come across a practical example of this
hypothetical. Id. While the Eleventh Circuit did suggest that it may have come
across such a situation in Robison, it did not conclude that the case qualified as an
example of the Gerke hypothetical and went no further than making a passing com-
ment that "this case arguably is one in which Justice Scalia's test may actually be
more likely to result in CWA jurisdiction thatJustice Kennedy's test." United States
v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1223 (11th Cir. 2007).
201. See Latham, supra note 3, at 16-19 (commenting on disarray among lower
federal courts due to Rapanos's conflicting jurisdictional tests).
202. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (providing list of post-Rapanos fed-
eral court decisions on subject of CWAJurisdiction). The Supreme Court denied
Cundiff certiorari on October, 5 2009. Id.
203. See United States v. Gerhe Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006)
(asserting possibility that Rapanos plurality would find CWA jurisdiction in case
where Justice Kennedy does not). When the Seventh Circuit created its hypotheti-
cal in Gerke, it gave no practical example to illustrate how the hypothetical situation
may actually occur. Id. at 724-25. Justice Stevens also questioned whether this hy-
pothetical was even possible in a practical sense, stating in his Rapanos dissent,
"While there may exist categories of wetlands adjacent to tributaries of traditionally
navigable waters that, taken cumulatively, have no plausibly discernible relation-
ship to any aspect of downstream water quality, I am skeptical." Rapanos v. United
States, 547 U.S. 715, 808 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sixth Circuit's em-
phasis on Marks-meets-Rapanos in Cundiff simply adds to this confusion and has
made the body of post-Rapanos case law even more "baffling" for the courts, the
regulating agencies, and the regulated community. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208-10.
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cluding that the rare case from Gerke deserves significant
consideration, the Sixth Circuit has unnecessarily complicated
CWA jurisdictional analysis. 204 At a minimum, the lower federal
courts within the Sixth Circuit will be burdened with the Marks-
meets-Rapanos analysis in future CWA cases. 205
Additionally, because of the confusion after Rapanos, it is likely
that any federal court analyzing a CWA jurisdictional issue will re-
view the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Cundiff When this occurs,
courts may feel compelled to pursue the same path of unnecessary
analysis.206 The proliferation of Gerke's notion that Rapanos cannot
be reconciled with Marks because of the hypothetical rare case is
one of the primary reasons for bemusement in this area of law.2 0 7
The confusion regarding CWA jurisdiction in the wake of
Rapanos and Cundiff has imposed significant litigation costs on two
important American industries: farming and real estate develop-
ment.2 08 Of the ten CWA jurisdictional cases appealed to the cir-
cuit court level, seven involved defendants that were clearing their
land for either farming or real estate development.209 Farmers and
developers find themselves at the center of litigation because the
actions triggering the CWA violations in these cases are extremely
common in both industries.210 Because the cost of obtaining a per-
mit under CWA section 404 can be very high, perplexity in this area
of the law can lead some farmers and developers to intentionally
avoid the permit process, thereby violating the CWA.211
204. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 208-10 (demonstrating depth of Sixth Circuit's
Marks-meets-Rapanos analysis).
205. See id. at 208 (revealing that lower courts are examining all possible inter-
pretations of Rapanos because of confusing and conflicting jurisdictional tests).
206. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (listing post-Rapanos federal court
decisions on subject of CWA jurisdiction).
207. See Cundiff 555 F.3d at 209-10 (demonstrating that courts have relied on
Gerke hypothetical despite no practical example existing).
208. See Post-Rapanos Caselaw, supra note 3 (providing list of post-Rapanos fed-
eral court decisions regarding CWA jurisdiction).
209. See id. (demonstrating extent to which confused area of law is causing
litigation).
210. See Enforcement Alert: EPA Takes Enforcement Actions Against Violators Who
Ditch Wetlands and Channelize Streams, EPA, 1-4 (Sept. 1999), http://www.epa.gov/
oecaerth/resources/newsletters/civil/enfalert/ditch.pdf (discussing reaction to
large-scale destruction in wetlands stemming from land developers).
211. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (reviewing average cost of obtaining permit to discharge pollutant). Jus-
tice Scalia, referring to the Corps as an "enlightened despot," explained that the
average person applying for a CWA section 404 permit spends 788 days and
$271,596 to complete the process. Id.
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A more significant impact may ultimately be the absence of liti-
gation due to the confused state of the law. 2 1 2 A much publicized
article in the New York Times last year reported that many of the
nation's largest water polluters are falling outside of the reach of
the federal government under the CWA.2 1s The article quotes both
attorneys and EPA officials who express their belief that the recent
Supreme Court decisions in SWANCC and Rapanos have reduced
the EPA's "ability to do what the law intends" to protect water qual-
ity.21 4 The EPA's role is not necessarily limited because of the pre-
cise holdings of the Supreme Court cases, but rather because these
decisions "have created widespread uncertainty." 215 This uncer-
tainty has caused regulators to drop enforcement actions in cases
that have the potential to consume inordinate time and
resources.216
The uncertainty in the law has also led many key stakeholders,
including EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson, to urge Congress to
resolve the persistent jurisdictional issue by amending the CWA. 217
Congress heeded these calls with the introduction of the Clean
Water Restoration Act of 2009 (CWRA).218 The proposed legisla-
tion would amend the CWA by clarifying the jurisdictional ques-
tions left open after RapanoS.219 Specifically, the CWRA proposes
212. See Charles Duhigg & Janet Roberts, Rulings Restrict Clean Water Act, Foil-
ing E.P.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/03/01/us/01water.html?_r=2 (discussing possibility that CWA lawsuits are
not being pursued due to high costs).
213. See id. (discussing potential impacts to environment in wake of confusion
caused by Rapanos).
214. Id. (asserting that confusion stemming from Rapanos opinions is im-
pacting EPA's ability to regulate).
215. Id. (discussing level of uncertainty regarding CWA jurisdiction post-
Rapanos).
216. See id. (explaining potential regulatory impact of confusion caused by
Rapanos). Some EPA attorneys "have established unwritten internal guidelines to
avoid cases" where proving jurisdiction under the CWA may be too difficult. Id.
Even in situations where regulators attempt to invoke jurisdiction under the CWA,
polluting companies have been able to delay cases for years because of ambiguities
in the law, and in some instances the regulators end up dropping their enforce-
ment actions. Id.
217. See Duhigg & Roberts, supra note 212 (stating that current EPA Adminis-
trator has appealed directly to Congress regarding potential amendment to CWA).
218. Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009, S. 787, 111th Cong. (2009) (as
introduced by Senator Russell Feingold, Apr. 2, 2009) (explaining that purpose of
bill is amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act in order to clarify jurisdic-
tion over waters of United States).
219. See Latham, supra note 3, at 20-21 (explaining likelihood of congres-
sional action in absence of Supreme Court clarification). If no action is taken
either by the Supreme Court or the regulating agencies, there is a possibility that
Congress may ultimately act. Id. at 20. Congressional action may in fact be a bet-
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replacing the term navigable waters with waters of the United States
throughout the CWA.220 This proposed change, however, is widely
viewed as a potentially significant expansion in the federal govern-
ment's ability to regulate water throughout the United States.221
Not surprisingly, many legislators, activists, and interest groups
are strongly opposed to the CWRA.222 The farming industry in par-
ticular would be significantly affected by the expansion of federal
jurisdiction.223 The CWRA's fate, however, has become more un-
certain as a result of the 2010 midterm elections and the Republi-
can Party gaining control of the House of Representatives.224 It is
ter approach because it would likely put an end to speculation regarding congres-
sional intent, something a Supreme Court decision cannot do entirely. Id. In
2003, Senator Feingold proposed a bill to amend the CWA in order to clarify ex-
istingjurisdictional questions. Id. Senator Feingold was also the initial sponsor of
the recent Senate Bill 787. See Clean Water Restoration Act of 2009, S. 787, 111th
Cong. (2009). With Democrats no longer controlling both chambers of Congress
as of January 2011, it appears that the best chance for amending the CWA has
passed. See Latham, supra note 3, at 21.
220. S. 787 § 5(1) (proposing amendment to CWA).
221. See David Lungren, EPW POLIcY BRIEF: THE SUPREME COURT AND CLEAN
WATER, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENv'T & PUB. WORKS, http://epw.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.Blogs&ContentRecord-id=3FIC88B7-80
2A-23AD-47A8-7D64C5D49B1C (last visited May 1, 2011) (explaining Republicans'
concerns with respect to proposed Clean Water Restoration Act). Republicans in
Congress argue that S. 787 effectively asserts CWA jurisdiction over "all interstate
and intrastate waters, including lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent
streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows,
playa lakes, and natural ponds, all tributaries of any of the above waters, and all
impoundments of the foregoing." Id. The proposed bill thereby extends CWA
jurisdiction far beyond the waters subject to federal control before the Supreme
Court narrowed jurisdiction in SWANCC and Rapanos, and would open the door to
a "nearly-limitless federal power grab over water." Id.
222. See id. (explaining Republican Party opposition to CWA amendments).
223. See L. Paul Goeringer & Rusty W. Rumley, The Clean Water Authority Resto-
ration Act: A Primer of Background Material, NAT'L Aciuc. L. CENTER, 9, http://www.
nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/articles/goeringer&rumley-cwara.pdf (last visited
May 1, 2011) (discussing impact of CWRA on agricultural sector). The CWA is
arguably the most significant piece of environmental legislation to the farming
industry. Id. Therefore, amendments to the act are of great importance to the
nation's famers. Id. Most significant are changes in the scope of CWAjurisdiction.
Id. Of note, the Obama administration has written a letter to the Senate Commit-
tee responsible for the bill in support of the effort to clarify CWA jurisdiction. Id.
at 6. Yet, a broad coalition of farm groups and local government organizations
have mounted opposition to the bill because they fear it will adversely impact eco-
nomic activity by extending federal regulatory jurisdiction over all water on farms,
including "ponds, ditches, and gutters." Hembree Brandon, Updating the Clean
Water Act, DELTA FARM PRESS, (Sept. 28, 2009, 9:29 AM), http://detafarmpress.
com/updating-clean-water-act.
224. See Latham, supra note 3, at 19-21 (commenting on possibilities for clari-
fication of CWA jurisdiction in absence of Supreme Court guidance). Given the
Supreme Court's inability to provide a clear definition of CWA jurisdiction, it is
unlikely that a future case in this area would provide any other outcome under the
present Court. Id. at 19. As a result, clarification is left to either the EPA or Corps
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currently unclear whether Congress will enact any legislation to re-
solve the confusion surrounding CWA jurisdiction.225 Ultimately,
until Congress, the Supreme Court, or a federal agency acts on this
issue, the battles will continue in the lower courts, and the EPA and
Corps will continue to struggle to administer the CWA in the wake
of Cundiff and the progeny of Rapanos.22 6
P. Ryan Henry*
via rulemaking, or to Congress through an amended statute. Id. Despite taking
initial actions to begin the rulemaking process after SWANCC, neither agency fol-
lowed through with a rule. Id. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the Corps
and EPA for failing to do so and placed blame on them for the current state of
disarray. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., con-
curring). Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Corps and EPA have had plenty of
room to operate in developing some outer bound to the reach of their authority,
but "the proposed rulemaking went nowhere." Id. He then stated that the current
fractured decision in Rapanos could have been readily avoided had an agency clari-
fied CWA jurisdiction through a rule. Id.
225. S. 787 § 5 (detailing current proposal to amend Federal Water Pollution
Control Act in order to clarify federal jurisdiction over waters of United States).
226. See Kim Diana Connolly, Any Hope for Happily Ever After? Reflections on
Rapanos and the Future of the Clean Water Act Section 404 Program, in Essays on the
Supreme Court's Clean Water Act Jurisprudence as Reflected in Rapanos v. United States,
VT.J. ENvrL. LAw 46, 62 (2007), http://www.vjel.org/books/pdf/PUBS10004.pdf
(explaining that CWA jurisdictional issues are likely to continue to cause litigation
unless Congress provides legislative clarification of CWA section 404).
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